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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

The main issue on appeal is whether this Court should allow the Idaho Department of
Health and Welfare's ("Department") to continue a decade long practice of making
impermissible and overly broad estate recovery claims. This case requires review of a federal
statute (42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)) and Idaho Code ("I.c.") § 56-218 and IDAPA 16.03.09.900 1, and
a determination as to whether the Department's claim premised on state law conflicts with
federal law and is therefore preempted by federal law.
Federal law requires the states to make claims against the probate estates of Medicaid
recipients to recover correctly paid benefits. Federal law also allows the states to expand the
definition of "estate" to include non-probate assets owned by a recipient at the time of the
recipient's death. Idaho has chosen this expanded definition of "estate." I.C. § 56-218(4)(b).
Nothing in the federal medical assistance statutes authorizes a direct medical assistance estate
claim against the estate of any person other than the recipient of benefits.
Under federal law, the states are permitted to pull back into a recipient's estate any
property or other assets in which the recipient held a legal title or interest at the time of the
recipient's death (to the extent of the interest). Idaho's estate recovery statute, I.c. § 56-218(1),
requires that a medical assistance claim be filed against the estate of a deceased recipient, but
also expands recovery claims beyond that allowed by federal law and authorizes claims against
the estate of the recipient's spouse who never received Medicaid benefits. The Department's
1

(now IDAPA 16.03.09.905)
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claim against George D. Perry's ("George") Estate ("Estate"), premised on I.e. § 56-218 (R, p.
22), conflicts with federal law because the Department asserts a claim against George's Estate
which does not contain any assets in which Martha J. Perry ("Martha") held a legal title or
interest at the time of her death.
The magistrate in this case upheld the Personal Representative's ("PR") disallowance of
the Department's claim and the district court affirmed that decision. A second Idaho magistrate
also rejected the same type of overly broad estate recovery claim the Department makes herein
and that decision was recently affirmed by another Idaho district court acting in its appellate
capacity. In The Matter of the Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins, Case No. CV2009-1926 (Idaho Third Judicial District, July 20,2011). For the Court's convenience, the
magistrate's decision in Wiggins is attached hereto as Appendix 1 and the Wiggins district court
decision is attached as Appendix 2.
Statement of Facts

The PR respectfully refers the Court to the Affidavit of Barbara McCormick and the
exhibits attached thereto for a detailed rendition of the facts. R, p. 93-110. Martha owned the
couple's horne as her separate property prior to her marriage to George. R, p. 133. On
November 18, 2002, Martha executed a deed conveying the horne to "Martha Jean Perry and
George Donald Perry" as grantees. It was recorded the same day. R, p. 134-135.
On July 31, 2006, George conveyed Martha's remaining interest in the couple's real
property to himself, acting as her agent pursuant to Martha's power of attorney. R p. 433. This
deed was also recorded on the date it was signed. R, p. 99. The PR sold the horne after
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George's death and filed a 90 day inventory listing the house sale proceeds in George's Estate as
his separate property. There was no community property listed in the inventory. R., p. 108. The
Department never objected to the characterization of property in this inventory. The only
property that Martha owned at the time of her death was one financial account located at Wells
Fargo. The balance of this Wells Fargo checking account was paid to the Department on August
13,2010 after Martha died. R., p. 96, 110.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL/ADDITIONAL ISSUE
The Department does not fairly state the issues presented in this appeal as required by
I.A.R. 35(a)(4) but instead frames them to argue its case. Those issues, fairly stated, are:
1. Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation of I.e. § 56-218, in
refusing to allow the State's claim against George's Estate.
2. Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p as
preempting application of I.C. § 56-218 and the Department's regulations.
3. Whether the magistrate erred in failing to apply Idaho Department of Health and Welfare
v. lackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998) to the facts of this case.
4. Whether the magistrate erred in holding that Martha's power of attorney gave George, as
her agent, sufficient authority to convey Martha's interest in the horne to George.
The PR adds the following issue on appeal.
5. Whether the Estate is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
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III. ARGUMENT

A. OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING RECOVERY OF
l\1EDICAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS CORRECTLY PAID
i. Statutory Framework.

The Medicaid program is jointly funded with the states as a "cooperative endeavor in
which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in
furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,308, 100 S.Ct. 2671,
65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into
state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). After this,
the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.c. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its
own program within the federal requirements, and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Services ("CMS") administers the program and approves state plans. Arkansas Dept. of Health
and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
When detennining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider
assets of both husband and wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.c. §
1396r-5(c) (2000). There are several provisions in place to protect the community spouse (the
spouse not applying for Medicaid) from being impoverished as a result of the spend down of
assets needed to qualify the applicant for Medicaid2 . Medicaid balances the obligation of

Typically, a married couple is required to "spend down" one-half of their "countable" resources before one spouse
will qualify for Medicaid. The value of the couple's home is not included among assets considered eligible to pay
for medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(5); 42 U.S.c. § 1382b(a)(l) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid
2
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community spouses to contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses
against the accommodation of the community spouse's need for his or her own support.

ii. Federal Medicaid Estate Recovery Provisions.
It is important to understand pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid recovery, to give context

to the post-1993 changes, and because pre-1993 law is the basis for the sole case in Idaho upon
which the Department relies exclusively for its position - i.e. Idaho Department of Health and

Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998). Prior to amendments adopted in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("OBRA") of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute stated a
general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to
several exceptions, one of which is relevant here:
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of
an individual under the State plan may be made, except --

****

(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he
received such assistance, from his estate. (emphasis added)
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (1988). Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required,
to recover Medicaid benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery
would be from the recipient's estate3 .
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 1993 4 .

As

recipient is also entitled to an allowance of income and assets designated for his or her needs that is not considered
available to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.c. § 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the recipient spouse
has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, to his or her community spouse. 42 U.S.c. §
1396p(c)(2).
3 The statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the
recipient's surviving spouse. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovery before the
death of a surviving spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The
pre-1993 federal law contained no definition of the term "estate."
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amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover
Medicaid payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual, with three (3) specific and

limited exceptions. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b) (2000). The 1993 amendments changed section
1396p(b) in several ways. First, the 1993 amendments lowered the age criterion for recovery
from 65 to 55. Second, the 1993 amendments made recovery allowed by the exceptions
mandatory rather than permissive. Third, the amendments added a definition of "estate," which
itself had both mandatory and permissive elements. As amended, the general nonrecovery rule
and the three limited exceptions are as follows:
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State
shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid
on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following

individuals:
(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection (a)(l)(B) of this section,
the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate or
upon sale of the property subject to a lien imposed on account of medical
assistance paid on behalf of the individual.
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or
recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical assistance consisting
of(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and
related hospital and prescription drug services, ...
(C) (i) In the case of an individual who has received (or is entitled to receive)
benefits under a long-term care insurance policy in connection with which assets
or resources are disregarded in the manner described in clause (ii), except as
provided in such clause, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the

OBRA of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312,627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.s.c. §
1396p(b)(l), (4) (2000)).

4
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individual's estate on account of medical assistance paid on behalf of the
individual for nursing facility and other long-term care services.
(emphasis added)
[d.

Under all three of the limited exceptions listed above, recovery is allowed only against
the estate of the individual who actually received the benefits (the recipient). The amended
version of section 1396p(b)(I)(B), at issue in the case at bar, retained the express reference to
recovery from the Medicaid recipient's estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this
recovery from the recipient's estate is only permitted after the death of the recipient's surviving
spouse. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(2). As with the pre-1993 version, the amended federal statute
contains no express authorization for, or reference to, recovery from a surviving spouse's estate.
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery,
with a mandatory provision that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that
authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the scope of probate law:
[T]he term "estate" with respect to a deceased individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include, at the option of the State * * * any other real and personal
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added).
Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of "estate" for Medicaid
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recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be
part of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass automatically to someone else on
the recipient's death 5 • Thus federal statutes place limits on the state's powers to define the scope
of recovery of medical assistance benefits correctly paid. The limits are set forth in 42 U.S.C. §
1396p. Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
iii.

Idaho's Medicaid Estate Recovery Provisions.
Idaho Code I.C. § 56-218, entitled "RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL

ASSISTANCE" states in pertinent part,
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fiftyfive (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance may
be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any,
for such aid paid to either or both: ...

(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of such
interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life
estate, living trust or other arrangement. (emphasis added).
Idaho has adopted verbatim the optional federal provision that authorizes states to expand
the definition of "estate" beyond the scope of state probate law. I.C. § 56-218(4)(b). Therefore,
5 For example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship and one dies, the
deceased joint tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate
estate. Under the optional expanded definition of "estate" allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes
the interest of a deceased joint tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than
passing directly to the surviving joint tenant.
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it follows that Idaho is required to abide by the way in which CMS and HHS read the language
in the federal statute. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers,
it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence
of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute. (emphasis added).
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781-82 (footnotes omitted).
The U.S. Supreme Court went on to indicate that when a statutory scheme has been
entrusted to an agency, "considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction." 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 2782. This same principle holds true with regard to
HHS's reading of the Medicaid statutes. In Wisconsin Dept of Health & Family Servs. v.
Blumer, 534 U.S. 473,497, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002), the Court stated,
The Secretary's position warrants respectful consideration. Cf. United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S.
504,512 (1994) (reliance on Secretary's "significant expertise" particularly
appropriate in the context of "a complex and highly technical regulatory program"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34,
43-44 (1981) (Secretary granted "exceptionally broad authority" by Congress
under the Medicaid statute).

B. THE DEPARTMENT MUST ACT CONSISTENTLY WITH FEDERAL LAW.
In In the Matter of Appeal of Stafford, 181 P.3d 456,461 (2008), this Court stated,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 9

Following passage of the MCCA [Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act], the
director of the Department requested the Attorney General's opinion as to whether
legislation was required to implement its provisions. The Attorney General
responded:
While participation in the Medicaid program is voluntary, a state that
chooses to participate must comply with all requirements imposed by the
federal statutory provisions and by regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services .... (emphasis added).
One of the requirements imposed on states in order to participate in the Medicaid
program and receive federal funding is that the state must "comply with the provisions of [42
U.S.c. § 1396p] ... " 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (2000). To the extent a state statute "seeks to
reach further than § 1396p(b)(1), it cannot stand." Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923,925 (9 th
Cir. 1997). The Department does not have a choice in this matter. It must follow federallaw 6 .
Idaho law currently allows the state to seek recovery for medical assistance paid "from
the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both."

I.e. § 56-218(1). The PR has challenged the Department's use of I.C. § 56-218(1) to
impermissibly expand estate claims in Idaho beyond that allowed by federallaw 7 . The PR also
challenges certain state regulations, such as IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 and 16.03.09.900.24 (now
found at IDAPA 16.03.09.905) that also reach further than the limited estate recovery allowed
under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b). These regulations are also preempted by federal law.

The Department does recognize that it "is bound by federal law." Department's Memorandum in Support, p. 15,
f.n. 11, R., p. 125.
7 For instance, there may exist some circumstances in which an asset in which the Medicaid recipient holds an
interest at death passes automatically upon death to the surviving spouse's estate. In that circumstance, the asset
would be recoverable from the surviving spouse's estate. For example, assets held jointly with rights of survivorship
would fall into this category. That is not the case with regard to the Department's claim in this case.
6
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C. THE DEPARTMENT'S CLAIM GOES TOO FAR, SEEKING TO RECOVER
AGAINST ASSETS THAT ARE NOT PART OF MARTHA'S ESTATE.
In order to be consistent with federal law, recovery claims against a Medicaid spouse's
estate must be against "assets in which the individuallMedicaid recipient] had any legal title or
interest at the time of death, to the extent of such interest." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). See

also,

I.e. § 56-218(4)(b).

This Court should affirm the magistrate's order disallowing the

Department's claim because that claim is against assets in which the Medicaid recipient (Martha)
had no legal title or interest at the time of her death.
The Magistrate recognized this core issue in his Order Disallowing Claim, p. 3 (R., p.
507), stating,
Jackman does not directly address the critical question for our case: To what
time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid
recipient's interest in property - any time (after 1993) during the couple's
marriage or the time of the recipient's death. (f.n. omitted) (emphasis added).
The District Court agreed with the Magistrate that the Department's argument on this point was
without merits. R., p. 713.
The Department also relies on IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 as support for its position.
Appellant's Brief, p. 12. That regulation states in part,
Limitations on Estate Claims. Limits on the Department's claim against the assets
of a deceased participant or spouse are subject to Sections 56-218 and 56-218A ,
Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the
value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993,
community property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate property, and
jointly owned property... (3-30-07) (emphasis added).
8 The

magistrate in Wiggins also held that "The Department may only recover against property in which the recipient
spouse had an interest at the time of her death." Appendix 1, Memorandum Decision, p. 7. The District Court in
Wiggins affirmed. Appendix 2, Memorandum Decision on Appeal, p. 6.
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Despite stating that this regulation is "subject to" LC. § 56-218 (which includes subsection
(4)(b)), the regulation then goes on to expand the definition of recoverable assets well beyond the
limitations set forth in Le. § 56-218(4)(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B)9. As discussed
below, the Magistrate properly ruled in rejecting the Department's "asset" vs. "estate" argument
and this Court should affirm that decision in its entirety.

D. FEDERAL LAW PREEl\1PTION OF STATE LAW
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,
479 U.S. 272, 280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). Even when Congress has not chosen
to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless preempt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state
and federal laws is impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when the state law
is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67,61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)10.

IDAPA 16.03.09.900.18 (now 16.03.09.904.05) entitled "Assets in Estate Subject to Claims" implicitly recognizes
the appropriate limitation on recovery claims when it states, "Assets in the estate from which the claim can be
satisfied must include all real or personal property that the deceased participant owned or in which he had an
ownership interest, including the following ... " The list that follows includes a variety of assets all of which have
one thing in common - the participant owned a legal title or interest in the asset at the time of death or acquired the
asset post-mortem.
9

10 The District Court also provides a concise and thorough review of the preemption doctrine and how it applies in
this case in its Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 12-16; R., p. 716-720.
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E. THE DEPARTMENT'S OVERLY BROAD RECOVERY CLAIM, BASED ON I.e. §
56-218 AND ITS REGULATIONS, CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL LAW, AND IS
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.
The Department's practice of using I.C. § 56-218 to improperly expand the scope of
estate recovery claims in Idaho violates federal law and is preempted by federal law.
Compliance with both state and federal law is impossible when the Department makes overly
broad estate recovery claims based on I.e. § 56-218 that reach beyond the explicit limits to
recovery set by federal law. This impermissible expansion occurs because the Department makes
a claim against assets which Martha did not own a legal title to or interest in at her death. As the
district court stated,
... [T]he federal government has outlined a general rule prohibiting recovery. As such,
Congress has indicated its object and desire to prevent recovery in all but limited number
of circumstances. It follows then, that if these circumstances are expanded by a
particular state law, the state law becomes an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress to limit recovery, and is
thereby preempted ....
As discussed in detail above, the federal provisions limit such recovery to assets of
the spouse in which the recipient had an interest at death.
Because the federal provisions seek, overall, to limit recovery except in certain
circumstances, because exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed
narrowly, and because the state provisions expand this recovery policy, the Court
finds the State provisions are preempted. Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109
S.Ct. 1455, 103 L.Ed2d 753 (1989). (emphasis added).
R., p. 718-720.
In Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 215-216, 970
P.2d 6,8-10 (1998), this Court held that the version of I.e. § 56-218 then in effect (pre-OBRA
1993) authorized the Department to recover against the surviving spouse's estate but expressly
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recognized that such recovery was limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid
recipient's estate as defined under state probate law. The Jackman Court recognized that federal
law does preempt the state law contained in I.C. § 56-218, and held that the only asset that might
be recoverable from the surviving spouse's estate was community property accumulated by the
couple after the execution of their marriage settlement agreement. Id. at 215-216. This Court
has already recognized, therefore, that federal law does preempt in the area of Medicaid recovery
claims - i.e. with respect to I.e. § 56-218.
As discussed infra, the Department has misread and misapplied Jackman for over a
decade. Unfortunately, what ensued after the Jackman decision was that the Department enacted
rules (e.g. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 and .24), and made claims in married couple Medicaid cases
as if the Court had ruled on the very issue it explicitly did not rule upon. The Department's
regulations (state law) conflict with federal law and are preempted by federal law.

F. A RECENT MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT DECISION AND THE
PROCEDURAL AFTERMATH OF THAT DECISION ARE DIRECTLY ON POINT
AND SUPPORT AFFIRMING THE MAGISTRATE'S ORDER.
In Re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) is the latest state court decision on
point and is on all fours with the instant case. The Court's analysis in Barg provides an in-depth
and exhaustive review of other state court cases analyzing the issue. Reading Barg in its entirety
is very instructive because Minnesota's department of health and welfare made the very same
argument in support of its recovery action as the Department makes in this action. The facts of

Barg, when pared down to the essentials, are essentially the same facts present in this probate.
In Barg, supra at 73-74, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a provision of the
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state's Medicaid estate recovery statute that allowed recovery from the estate of a surviving
spouse for any assets jointly owned by the couple at any point during their marriage!!. In that
case, Mrs. Barg transferred her partial interest in the couple's home to her husband when she
entered a nursing home. She died without leaving a probate estate and her husband died soon
thereafter. The county then sought recovery against Mr. Barg's estate for the amount of
Medicaid benefits paid out on behalf of Mrs. Barg. The Barg Court determined that the county
could recover only from assets that the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest in at the time of
her death. Mrs. Barg had no legal interest in any property when she died because she had
transferred her interests to her husband while she was alive. Therefore, the Court ruled that the
county had no way to seek recovery from Mr. Barg's estate!2. [d.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota discussed 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b) in depth. This
discussion is directly applicable to the instant case because Idaho has adopted the federal

language in that statute verbatim in I.e. § 56-218(4)(b). In discussing the statutes at issue the
Court rejected the Department's argument that use of the word "assets" in 42 U.S.c. §
1396p(b)(4)(B) permitted recovery against assets which the Medicaid recipient transferred inter

vivos. The Barg Court also rejected the argument that the "other arrangement" phrase opened
the door for the broader recovery allowed under Minnesota's statute.

11 In this regard, IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 is just as impermissibly expansive as was the statute in Barg that the Court
held was preempted by federal law.
12 These are the same facts present in the instant case. Martha transferred her remaining interest in the couple's
home to her husband in 2006, prior to applying for Medicaid benefits. She retained no legal interest in that real
property, nor in the proceeds from the sale of that real property, which are the only assets that make up her
husband's estate.
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With the Court's indulgence, the Barg opinion is cited at length below because it is so
directly on point with the case at bar. The Court stated in pertinent part,
We turn to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a
surviving spouse's estate allowed under Minnesota law is consistent with
federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 256B.15 allows the state to recover
from a surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were
marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage."
(Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority
does not conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section
1396p(b) should be construed broadly and the 1993 amendments were intended to
expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this argument for
broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with
the dual goals of federal law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance
available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting community spouses from
pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section
1396p(b)(1) allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section
1396p(b)(4) allows expansion of the estate only to include assets in which the
recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage"
recovery allowed by subdivision 2 is preempted.
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring
the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its language.
Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre1993 federal law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of
assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but transferred by the
recipient spouse prior to her death •...
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional
definition of "estate" allows inclusion of
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust,
or other arrangement.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further
describes the assets that a state may include in this expanded estate. The
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clause describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such,"
and second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are
"conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers back to the immediately
preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had
any legal title or interest at the time of death." The including clause then
describes to whom "such" assets may have been conveyed--a "survivor, heir,
or assign of the deceased individual." Id. (emphasis added). And finally, the
clause describes several methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets
might take place -- "through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." ld.
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the
recipient having a legal interest at the time of death. When we construe a
federal statute we must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress
used." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d
931 (1979). To read "other arrangement" to include a lifetime transfer would
be to read the words "at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion
that" other arrangement" cannot include lifetime transfers is further
supported by the additional context. "[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of
examples of conveyances that occur at the time of death. The list of recipients
of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual,"
leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid recipient, must have died
for the conveyance to occur. A recipient cannot have heirs or survivors
during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the deceased"
during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language and its
context, the conclusion of the Wirtz court that" other arrangement" is
sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable.
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did
not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every
decision except Wirtz. to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to
expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold
that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the
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recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis
added)
[d. at 68-71.

The State of Minnesota filed a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court seeking to
overturn the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in Barg. The U.S. Supreme Court issued an
order inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States on the matter.
Appendix 3, p. 1. In May of 2009, the U.S. Solicitor General submitted an amicus curiae brief
authored by not only that office but joined by the attorneys from the Department of HHS in
response to the U.S. Supreme Court's request. This is the most recent legal briefing by HHS
on the issue. The United States' brief examines and rejects each and every argument posited by
the State of Minnesota seeking to expand Medicaid estate recovery beyond that allowed by
federal law. For the Court's convenience, the entire United States Solicitor General's amicus
curiae brief is appended hereto as Appendix 3.

The import of the United States' briefing in this matter cannot be overemphasized. The
legal positions taken in that brief represent HHS' s reading of the federal law at issue in this case.
CMS, as noted above, is governed by HHS. By accepting federal support for its Medicaid
program, Idaho is legally obligated to abide by HHS/CMS's view of federal Medicaid law.
Congress has extended HHS extremely broad authority in the Medicaid area. See Chevron and
Blumer, supra.

In its 2009 amicus brief, HHS expressly rejects the interpretation and rationale that the
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Department relies upon in using I.C. § 56-218 to support the claim made against George's Estate.
The United StateslHHS stated in pertinent part,
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision is correct and does not warrant
further review. The federal Medicaid Act permits recovery of correctly paid
benefits from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse, but limits that
recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at
the time of her death ...
A. The Decision Of The Minnesota Supreme Court Is Correct

The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly concluded that the
Medicaid Act forbids petitioner from seeking to recover correctly paid
benefits from assets in which the Medicaid recipient had no legal interest at
the time of her death .
1.

. . . the Medicaid Act, which permits recovery only after the death of
the recipient's surviving spouse, 42 U.S.c. 1396p(b)(2), authorizes a State to
file a reimbursement claim against the surviving spouse's estate, up to the
value of any assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the
time of her death.
The Minnesota estate-recovery law exceeds the scope of that
authorization. It permits the State to recover from a surviving spouse's
estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or
jointly owned property at any time during the marriage, " Minn. Stat. Ann. §
256B.15, subd. 2 (2007) (emphasis added), without regard to whether the
recipient retained an interest in the assets at the time of her death. Because a
State may not recover correctly paid Medicaid benefits except to the extent
authorized by federal law, see 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(1), Minnesota's statute
conflicts with federal law and is therefore preempted.... (emphasis added).
Appendix 3, p. 8-9. The United States Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General's
briefing/opinion on the matter. The Court decided not to grant cert in Barg. It is
reasonable to assume the Court accepted the Solicitor General's view of the matter.
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G. THE JACKMAN DECISION IS NEITHER CONTROLLING, NOR DISPOSITIVE.
In 2005, this Court considered the Department's claim filed in the probate of a Medicaid
recipient's estate whose spouse survived him. In Re Estate of Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436, 111 P.
3d 121 (2005). In Kaminsky, the Court recognized that the Department's recovery claim was
properly made only against the Medicaid recipient's estate. The Court stated,
Only persons with few financial resources qualify for assistance and assistance
comes with strings attached. Included in these strings is a right on the part of
the State, pursuant to I.C. § 56-218, to obtain reimbursement of Medicaid
assistance from the estate of a recipient. Under any reasonable definition,
this right of recovery constitutes a "claim" against the recipient's estate.
(emphasis added).

Id. at 439. This is entirely consistent with federal law which sets forth a general rule of
nonrecovery, and then provides an exception that is limited to recovery against the recipient's or
the individual's estate. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(1)13. In Wiggins, supra at 10, the District Court
stated, "The Department admitted that the state and federal definitions of "estate" apply only to
the "individual's" estate (i.e. recipient, not spouse of recipient)."
i. The Jackman Decision Is A Pre-OBRA 1993 Case. This Court Has Never Ruled On The
Post-OBRA 1993 Issue On Appeal.
As it argued below, the Department's primary argument on appeal is that Idaho

Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998) is dispositive
and supports its § 1396p(h) "asset" argument. Appellant's Brief, p. 13. Throughout this case
the following points have emerged: 1) The Department cites and relies heavily upon a Jackman
opinion that this Court withdrew. The withdrawn opinion is not Idaho law, has absolutely no
13 It is a basic principle of statutory construction that the enumeration of exceptions in a statute is construed as an
exclusion of all other exceptions. See e.g., Hines v. Department of Public Aid, 850 N.E.2d 148, 153 (Illinois 2006).
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precedential value and is not binding upon this Court; and 2) The Department relies on dicta in
the substituted and published Jackman decision to bootstrap itself into a position of arguing that
somehow the law is settled in this area by the withdrawn Jackman opinion14.
In its November 2, 1998 Jackman decision, the opinion clearly notes "Substitute Opinion
The Court's Prior Opinion Dated June 16, 1998, Is Hereby Withdrawn." See Department Cases,
p. 2; R., p. 441. The Internal Rules Of The Idaho Supreme Court, Rule 15(f) states in part:

(f) Unpublished Opinions of the Court. ... If an opinion is not published, it
may not be cited as authority or precedent in any court. (emphasis added).
The June 16, 1998 Jackman opinion was never published. The Court withdrew it and
issued a substitute opinion. The June 16, 1998 Jackman opinion may not be cited as authority or

14 The briefing below created some confusion between pre-eligibility transfers and look-back rules with posteligibility rights. The look back period referred to in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c) applies when one spouse applies for
Medicaid. Once one spouse qualifies for Medicaid, any resources belonging to the community or nonrecipient spouse are solely the property of that spouse and the non-recipient spouse can do whatever he wants
with them. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4).
The import of this statute was discussed in a June 29, 1999 letter to Idaho attorney Rod Gere from Robert Reed,
Chief of the Medicaid Branch of the HHS Division of Medicaid and State Operations for Region X. This letter was
copied to Karl Kurtz, then acting Director of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and stated in part,
Thus, after the eligibility determination any resources belonging to the community spouse are
solely the property of that spouse. That spouse can do whatever he or she wants to with them,
including leaving them, via a will, to particular heirs that do not include the institutionalized
spouse. (emphasis added).
The Department argued that this inquiry had to do with whether the Medicaid spouse was made ineligible by the
non-recipient spouse's transfer of assets. While true, that point doesn't undercut the fact that CMS has stated the
non-recipient spouse can do whatever they want with these assets post-eligibility, including leave assets to
childrenlheirs via a Last Will & Testament upon death. This directly contradicts the Department's assertion that it
has the right to capture those assets in an estate recovery claim. See also, AprilS, 2000 letter from Ronald Preston,
HHS Associate Regional Administrator for Region I stating in part,
Thus, after the month in which an institutionalized spouse is determined eligible for
Medicaid, any resources belonging to the community spouse are solely the property of that
spouse. That is, the community spouse can do whatever he or she wants to with them.
(emphasis added)
The above-cited HHS letters are attached hereto for the Court's convenience as Appendix 4. Federal law
simply does not treat the property of the recipient and that of the non-recipient spouse as the same posteligibility. Of course, estate recovery only occurs post-eligibility.
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precedent in this Court. Yet the Department cited the withdrawn opinion repeatedly before the
Magistrate as well as the District Court and continues to rely on the withdrawn opinion 15 .
R., p. 123-124,547,675. Appellant's Brief, p. 14, f.n. 5. The withdrawn Jackman opinion

carries absolutely no weight on the issue before this Court. It certainly in no way establishes law
in Idaho with regard to the federal law issue on appeal. Yet the Department would have this
Court speculate as to what the Jackman Court would have opined had it ruled on the issue at bar,
because of reasoning or rationale in an opinion that the Court never published and withdrew.
The Department must continue to rely on the unpublished opinion, even though this is
improper, in order to draw the "implication" it alone sees in the published decision. Throughout
this case, starting with the magistrate, the Department has consistently ascribed a holding to
Jackman that the Court simply did not make. The fundamental problem with the Department's

reliance on the published Jackman decision is that the Court was dealing with a situation that
pre-dated the OBRA-1993 amendments. This Court in Jackman stated repeatedly and was very

careful to make sure that its opinion was restricted to the version of federal law applicable to the
controversy before it - in other words the decision was applicable only to cases arising preOBRA 1993. Jackman was explicitly restricted to the facts in that case. The Court made this
very clear when it stated its holding that, "We conclude that section 56-218(1) of the Idaho Code
(I.e.), as it existed at times applicable to this case, ... " (emphasis added). Jackman, supra at

214.

15 Despite the fact that the Department tries to explain away its citation to the withdrawn opinion, it continues to
improperly rely on that opinion in violation of this Court's internal rule 15(t). Appellant's Brief, p. 14, fn. 5.
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The Court also stated,
We conclude that this [the post-OBRA 1993] definition of "assets" is not
applicable to the agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and
Hildor on March 8, 1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993
amendments to the federal statute does not apply "with respect to assets
disposed of on or before the date of the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]."
Pub. L. 103-66, § 13611(e). Therefore, it [the post-OBRA 1993 definition of
"assets"] does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department
to recover the balance of Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property.

lackman, supra at 216.
The Department contends that because the Court discussed the OBRA 1993 amendments
that this somehow settles the issue. Justice Johnson's statements in lackman, upon which the
Department so heavily relies, are simply dicta or dictum 16• Justice Johnson's comments on how
to interpret the post-OBRA amendments in federal law were not involved in nor necessary to the
holding in the published lackman decision which was a pre-OBRA 1993 case. The Court says
as much - repeatedly17. The Magistrate also appropriately recognized that lackman does not
control this post-OBRA 1993 case and does not support the Department's misapplication of I.e.
§ 56-218. The magistrate stated,
"Dicta" is defined as,
Opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the specific case before the
court. Expressions in the court's opinion which go beyond the facts before court and therefore are
individual views of author of opinion and not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent.
(emphasis added)
Dictum is defined as foIlows:
The word is generally used as an abbreviated form of obiter dictum, ... Statements and comments in an
opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to
determination of the case in hand are obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication.
(emphasis added).
Black's Law Dictionary (6 th ed. 1991).
17 The Department admits as much when it states that, "there was no issue as to property transfers after October 1,
1993" at issue in Jackman and the question before the Jackman Court "was not what Hildor [the Medicaid recipient]
owned at death." (emphasis added). R., p. 546.
16
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THE COURT ... I really have been struggling to deal with the definitions
of estate and assets in both the state and federal's schemes .... I perceive the
State as saying that Jackman [sic] allows the Court to look at any time, any
period of time, in which the recipient of benefits had an interest in property..
. . I don't see that Jackman [sic] says that.... Because I think we've got to
look at the published opinion, not the first one. What does that leave us.
And I don't think it leaves us much.
At least that's how it feels to me, that it doesn't necessarily say to me that
the State may look to any period of time after 1993 that a Medicaid beneficiary,
Medicaid recipient had an interest in property. I don't think it [Jackman] makes
that determination .... I don't think it [Jackman] makes a determination of
where in that period of time the estate may look at the recipient's interest in
property. (emphasis added).
Tr., p. 12, LL. 18 through p. 13, LL. 25.
The District Court agreed stating,

The State's reliance on Jackman is based largely on the original opinion in
that case, which has since been substituted. The State urges this Court to consider this
opinion, arguing that it clearly shows the court's intent to give "assets" a broad
interpretation, and that the decision would have been different if the court had been able
to apply the statutes in their current form. The Court does not agree. The full reasons
for issuing a substitute opinion are not ascertainable by simple comparison of a substitute
opinion. Given Internal Rule of the Idaho Supreme Court 15(f)'s prohibition against
citation of unpublished opinions, the Court will not speculate about a withdrawn
opinion to determine how the clear and unambiguous language of the statutes in
question should be interpreted, or to determine the applicability of the preemption
doctrine I 8. (emphasis added).
R., p. 721.

Most recently another Idaho district court, acting in its appellate capacity, came to the same conclusion. In
Wiggins, the District Court rejected the Department's argument that Jackman decided this issue and stated,
While the Supreme Court [in Jackman] did talk about the effect of the 1993 amendments in
broadening the definition of "assets," that was not necessary to the Court's decision based on its
reasoning. The Court was not presented directly with the question of whether, under the law as it now
exists, federal law would trump state community property laws in making separate property liable for debts
that could otherwise not be recovered from separate property. (emphasis added).
/d. at 12. In other words, the Department is relying on dictum in the published Jackman decision.
18
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No matter how much the Department would like to draw implications or
speculate about the Jackman decision based on the unpublished opinion, the fact remains

-Jackman does not control the outcome of this case. This Court should affirm the
Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim, and do so unencumbered by the Department's
efforts to shackle the Court's analysis with dicta from the Jackman opinion. 19

H. FEDERAL LAW CONTAINED IN 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) IS CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS. THE DEPARTMENT'S CLAIM, BASED ON THE GENERAL
DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" IN 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1), HAS NO MERIT.
As noted above, federal law says nothing about allowing recovery from assets in which
the Medicaid recipient does not have an interest at death. The U.S. Solicitor General's brief
plainly rejects the Department's argument relying on the definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. §
1396p(h)(l) attempting to expand the scope of allowed recovery, stating,

2.
Petitioner [State of Minnesota] argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on permissible recovery from the estate of the
Medicaid recipient's surviving spouse, because the Act defines the term
"assets" to include "all income and resources of the individual and of the
individual's spouse." 42 U.S.c. 1396p(h)(1). According to petitioner, "[b]y
including resources of both 'the individual' and 'of the individuals spouse' in
the meaning of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's resources
fall within the scope of § 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet. 27.
Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statutory definition of
"assets" does encompass resources of both "the individual" (i.e., the
Medicaid recipient) and "The individual's spouse," the particular provision
of the Medicaid Act at issue here refers specifically to any "assets in which
19 Assuming arguendo that this Court concluded that the Jackman opinion's dicta upon which the Department relies
was actually a holding in the case, the Court should still rule in the PR's favor for all the reasons urged by the PRo It
is well past time for Idaho law to be brought into line with mandatory federal statutes which require that estate
recovery in Idaho be limited to recovery against assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest in at death, as
clearly defined in federal law.
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the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death." 42 U.S.c.
1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Petitioner's argument finds it necessary to
rewrite that clause to read "'any * * * assets in which [either or both the
individual and the individual's spousel had any legal title or interest.'" Pet. 26
(brackets and asterisk in original) (emphasis added). But this editing does
nothing less than make the statute say the opposite of what it says. The plain
language of the operative provision of the Act refutes petitioner's readings. 2o
4.
Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity about limiting spousal
estate recovery to the value of assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a
legal interest at the time of death, the presumption against preemption does
not come into play, Pet. 28 ... (emphasis added).
Appendix 3, U.S. Solicitor amicus brief, p. 10-12.
The U.S. Solicitor General concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) "leaves no ambiguity
about limiting spousal estate recovery to the value of assets in which the Medicaid recipient had
a legal interest at the time of death." ld. at 12. The point could not be more clear - the
Department's argument that the general definition of "assets" contained in § 1396p(h)
changes the plain wording in § 1396p(b)(4)(B) is incorrect. HHS spoke through its legal
counsel to the U.S. Supreme Court as to its reading of this federal law. As noted above, a federal
agency's reading of federal statutes is entitled to great weight and HHS has extremely broad
authority in the Medicaid area. Chevron and Blumer, supra.

20 (footnote 2 in the original amicus brief) In describing the operation of the amended estate-recovery provision, the
legislative history of the 1993 amendments also focused on the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid
benefits, rather than the resources of both the individual and his or her spouse. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 213, l03d
Cong., 1st Sess. 835 (1993) ("At the option of the State, the estate against [which] * * * recovery is sought may
include any real or personal property or other assets in which the beneficiary had any legal title or interest at the time
of death, including the home.") (emphasis added) (footnote original)
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i. Basic Rules Of Statutory Construction Support The Magistrate's Decision.
Applying well-established rules of statutory construction also supports the conclusion
that the Department's position is without merit. Subsection 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)'s definition
of "estate" is specific to "this subsection" meaning subsection (b) of 42 U.S. C. § 1396p. In
contrast, subsection 42 U .S.c. § 1396p(h)( 1)' s definition of "assets" applies generally to "this
section (i.e. all of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p) and is included in the "definitions" section at the end of the
statute. When interpreting statutory definitions and provisions, specific definitions take
precedence over general definitions21.
The more specific definition of "estate" under (b)(4) supplants or takes precedence over
the broader, more general definition of assets in (h)(l), thereby imposing limits on what is
recoverable in Medicaid recovery actions. The Department's interpretation attempts to reverse
this, and superimpose the general definition of "assets" improperly upon the specific definition
of "estate" that applies in 42 U.S. C. § 1396p(b)(4 )(B). The Solicitor General explicitly rejected
this flawed statutory analysis 22 . The Department's reliance on the definition of "asset" in §
1396p(h) to supplant and in essence re-write the specific definition of the word "estate" in §
1396p(b)(4) is simply without merit.

See e.g., In re Drainage District No.3, 40 Idaho 549, 553, 235 P.2d 895 (1925), citing Sutherland on Statutory
Construction, sec. 387.
22 The application of a more general definition of "assets" makes sense in other subsections in § I 396p that do not
contain a specific definition of an applicable term used in the particular subsection itself, as does § 1396p(b)(4)'s
definition of "estate." For instance, 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(c), entitled "Taking into account certain transfers of assets"
contains the Medicaid asset transfer penalty rule that applies in eligibility determinations. The application of the
general definition of the word "asset" in § 1396p(h) makes sense when applied to § 1396p(c)'s use of that term for
two reasons: I) an asset transfer penalty applies when determining Medicaid eligibility no matter which spouse
transferred the asset; and 2) § 1396p(c) does not contain language defming a term used in that particular subsection
as does § I 396p(b)(4) definition of the term "estate".
21
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ii. Wirtz Is An Anomoly That Should Not Be Followed In Idaho. Its Unpersuasive
Reasoning Has Been Roundly Rejected.

The Department cites In re Estate a/Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000) indicating that
the North Dakota Supreme Court "relied on this same reasoning" to uphold a recovery claim.
Appellant's Brief, p. 14. Jackman cannot be cited for the proposition the Department would like
to cite it for (i.e. the unpublished opinion), so that leaves Wirtz standing alone.
The Department does not assert the same position that the Wirtz court relied upon to
justify its decision. The Wirtz court did not rely on the definition of "assets" in § 1396p(h). The

Wirtz court reached the result it sought on a finding that the words "interest" and "other
arrangement" in § 1396p(b)(4)(B) were ambiguous, allowing it to "resort to extrinsic aids to
ascertain the legislative intent" and thereby rewrite the statutory language. Wirtz, supra at 885.
Recognizing the clear weight of cogent, well-reasoned authority, the Magistrate rejected
the untenable "asset" definition argument and the Wirtz reasoning. The Magistrate stated,
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate
because Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's
spouse; 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of
"estate" and 42 U.S.c. 1396p(h)(1) says "assets" includes property that a person
transferred to her spouse. The court cannot accept this interpretation.
The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in
Estate a/Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received
Medicaid benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the
estate of Vema Witz [sic], Clarence's wife. The Wirtz court analyzed the federal
statutory definitions of "estate" and "asset" as quoted above and held that" ... any
assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Vema Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's death
are subject to the department's recovery claim." Id. at 886. This ruling depends,
however, on an awkward interpretation of the term "other arrangement" in 42
U.S.c. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dakota court in Wirtz interpreted the "other
arrangement" language independently from the rest of the section. The bulk of
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the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an automatic fashion on the
death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfers and life estates.
It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of
property of this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in the context
of the surrounding language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include
transfers of a similar, automatic nature not any possible transfer. (emphasis
original).
R., p. 508-509. The District Court also rejected the Wirtz court's reasoning, stating, "The
Court first considered the plain language contained in the provisions, which it found
unambiguous." (emphasis added). R., p. 720.
The Magistrate went on to note that the Minnesota Supreme Court in Barg, supra at 71,
provided a "more reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory language." Id. The Barg
Court thoroughly discussed and rejected Wirtz stating,
.. . Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed
that authority to extend to assets that were transferred before the death of
the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993
amendments to support that extension. See In re Estate oj Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d
882, 885-86 (N.D.2000) ....

Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other
than the Medicaid recipient's estate have construed that authority to reach only
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, that
is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state
probate law or included in the estate under an expanded definition allowed by the
1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 (limiting
recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate
law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 (same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that
recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid recovery
statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid
recipient's estate as defined under state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d
at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of 'estate' in [section]
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the time of death'''); see also In re
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Estate afSmith, No. M2005-0I41O-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov.l, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery
against estates of surviving spouses have required that recipient had interest in
assets at time of death) ....

As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting
principle requiring an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. . .. Concluding
that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied
on the Congressional intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking
Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-86....
We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993
amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied in Wirtz. The plain meaning of
"other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is
arrangements other than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the
time of the Medicaid recipient's death •...
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did
not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every
decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to
expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold
that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis
added)
Barg, supra at 68-71 23 .

No court addressing a post-OBRA 1993 estate recovery claim

has accepted and followed the Wirtz rationale. The Wirtz court's reasoning is

23 See also, In re Estate of Smith, (Tenn.App. 2006) ("We must respectfully disagree with the rationale of Wirtz
since under 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4)(B), in order to be potentially recoverable, an asset must be one in which the
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indefensible and this Court distinguishes itself by joining the chorus of other decisions
that have rejected it.

iii. Neither I.e. § 56-218 Nor The Department's Regulations Change Community
Property Law In Idaho.
In prior briefing, the Department has tried to prop up Wirtz by arguing that the
Solicitor General mentioned that Wirtz may not be inconsistent with Barg because the
Wirtz decision may be due to "different views of when, under state law, a spouse retains a
legal interest in property conveyed to his or her spouse." R., p. 680; Solicitor General
amicus brief, supra at p. 14. Federal law limits the scope of estate recovery to assets in
which the Medicaid recipient has an interest in at death. State law then enters into the
analysis to determine whether the Medicaid recipient retained an interest in any assets at
death.
Idaho law stands for the proposition that when someone completely divests
themselves of property during their lifetime, they do not retain any legal title or interest in
that property at the time of their death. The Magistrate so held when he stated,
. " When making a claim against the estate of a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the
Department may only recover against property in which the recipient spouse had
an interest at the time of her death. Martha Perry conveyed all of her interest
in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was no joint tenancy, right of
survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have conveyed any interest

recipient had a 'legal title or interest at the time of death. ''').
The North Dakota Supreme Court is the only court to deviate from this limiting principle requiring
an interest at the time of death. In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 2000), held that any
assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to his or her spouse before the recipient's death were subject to
recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, relying on Congressional intent it perceived "to allow states
wide latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." [d. at 885-86. (emphasis added).
32 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 498,515 (ABA, July/August 2008).
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in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The Department may not
recover Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the proceeds from the sale of this
property. (emphasis added).
R., p. 510. The District Court agreed stating,
The State disputes the magistrate and personal representative's
interpretation, which places emphasis on the phrases limiting the property and
assets of the recipient of benefits held "at the time of death." The magistrate
found that this definition of "estate" did not permit a state agency to look back
and recover property interests that the recipient divested prior to death. This
Court agrees. The language and definition of "estate" is broad, and includes all
interests, including any which may have automatically transferred upon the death
of the recipient. However, it goes without saying that where a recipient has
long ago been divested of any particular interest, it would not fall within that
individual's estate. Moreover, nothing in this provision [42 U.S.C. §
1396p(b)(4)] seeks to preserve interests that were divested well before death,
something which the drafters were clearly able to articulate in those
provisions dealing with Medicaid eligibility requirements 24 .
R., p. 711-712.
In the proceedings below the Department argued that I.C. § 56-218(4) actually

changed marital property law in Idaho. R., p. 688. In Wiggins, supra, the district court
expressly rejected this same argument stating,
It appears from a plain reading of this section [I.e. § 56-218(4)] that the

recipient's estate includes not only property in which the recipient had a legal
interest but also property which passed by operation of law to someone else at the
time of the recipient's death. Neither of those circumstances would include
24

The district court also correctly observed,
Indeed, when addressing the eligibility requirements for assistance, under § 1396p(c)(l)(A), the drafters
made those who transfer property "for less than fair market value" ineligible for assistance. The State
argues it would be absurd to prohibit the recipient and/or recipient's spouse from disposing of assets below
market value in eligibility determinations, while allowing assets to be transferred at no cost post-eligibility
for purposes of avoiding reimbursement or recovery payments in probate. However, § 1396p(c)( l)(A)
deals specifically with eligibility, not recovery. Had the drafters sought to include this same provision in
the area of probate and recovery matters, they easily could have made such a distinction. (emphasis added).
Id.
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property which the recipient had sold, given away or transferred prior to
death ...
Part of the difficulty is that the Department's interpretation of what
should be included in the recipient's estate ignores Idaho community
property law and does not address the impact of having separate property in the
recipient spouse's estate. Indeed, in its brief, the Department asserts that I.e.
§ 56-218(1) "effectively alters marital property law in Idaho when it comes to
the property of Medicaid recipients and their spouses." There is no
indication in this statute that the Idaho legislature intended such a sweeping
change by simpl! authorizing the State to assert a claim against a recipient's
spouse's estate. 2 (emphasis added).
Appendix 2, p. 6-7. The Department is asking this Court to change basic principles of
Idaho community property law to permit the claim it makes against George's Estate.
There is no legal justification for this result.
I. THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT.
The Department has repeatedly invited the lower courts to engage in a policy
debate on the intent behind the federal law, and the PR anticipates it will do so again in
its Reply Brief. R, pgs. 531-532;534-535;541;666-668;671-672;676-677;689. The
Department's opinion of public policy, Congressional intent, or the purpose of the
Medicaid statutes is irrelevant. This Court need not, indeed may not, engage in policy
interpretations when faced with clear, unambiguous federal statutes.

In Wiggins, the Department also "admitted that it cannot pursue property that has always been the separate
property of the recipient's spouse (even though this contradicts the Department's argument that I.e. § 56-218
broadly allows recovery against both spouses' estates)." ld. at 8. The Department then raised IDAPA
16.03.09.900.20 and 16.03.09.900.24 as justification for its position, just as it does in the case at bar. The District
Court was not persuaded, stating, "At oral argument the Department was unable to justify the reasoning or logic to
support its position that some separate property of the recipient's spouse is liable to the State while other separate
property is not (apart from the Rule mentioned above)." ld. at 9.
25
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Analysis of a statute or regulation always begins with the literal language of the
enactment. Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197,46
P.3d 9, 14 (2002) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has established that it
will not look to the legislative intent of a regulation where the express written
language of the regulation is unambiguous. Friends of Farm to Market, 137
Idaho at 197,46 P.3d at 14 (citing Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175,560 P.2d 497
(1977». "Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to
construe the language." Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, then a
court may not interpret the language to include an unwritten legislative intent.
Stafford, supra at 464-465. As Minnesota's Supreme Court noted in discussing the same types

of policy arguments made by the Department in this case, "[that] argument would take us too far
down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its
language." Barg, supra at 69.

J. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE MAGISTRATE'S HOLDING THAT
GEORGE, AS HIS WIFE'S AGENT, HAD LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN THE
REAL PROPERTY TRANSFER AT ISSUE ON HER BEHALF26 .
i. The Conveyance At Issue Was "For Value Received." The Deed Speaks For Itself.
26 The power of attorney issue discussed in this section is not determinative of the estate recovery/federal law
preemption issues raised in this appeal. The Department argues that "if Martha still had an interest in the property at
the time of her death, then the second issue, relating to preemption, is never reached." Appellant's Brief, p. 5.
This is incorrect. No matter how the Court rules on the power of attorney issue, it still must reach the PR's
argument that the Department's claim in this case is impermissibly broad and that Idaho estate recovery law
conflicts with federal law and is preempted by federal law.
It is not disputed that Martha owned the couple's home as her separate property prior to her marriage to
George. R., p. 133. It is also undisputed that on November 18,2002, Martha executed a deed conveying a Y2
interest in the home to her husband George. R., p. 134-135. The Department has never challenged the legal efficacy
of this transfer. On July 31, 2006, Martha conveyed her remaining interest in the home to George, at which time the
home became George's separate property. I.C. §§ 32-903,32-906. The Department challenges George's authority
to engage in this conveyance for Martha.
The legal effect of a finding that George did not have the authority to convey Martha's remaining interest
in the home to himself would be that Martha retained that interest. Yet the Department's claim seeks to recover
against the entire value of the house sale proceeds, not just a Y2 interest in those proceeds. This claim exceeds what
Martha owned or had title to at her death, even assuming arguendo that this Court held that George did not have the
authority to engage in the transfer at issue. Therefore, no matter how the Court rules on the power of attorney issue,
it must still resolve the estate recovery/federal law preemption issues.
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Both the Magistrate and District Court found that the among the powers sufficient to
authorize George to act for Martha in signing the July 31,2006 was paragraph A, which included
expansive real property powers. Paragraph (A) entitled "Real property transactions" authorized
George to deal with her real property,
on such terms and conditions ... as my Agent shall deem proper; and to ... convey ...
and in any way or manner deal with all or any part of any interest in real property
whatsoever, including specifically, but without limitation, real property lying and being
situated in the State of Idaho, under such terms and conditions ... as my Agent shall
deem proper.
The Magistrate ruled from the bench on the power of attorney issue stating,
The power of attorney issue was - is interesting to me and ...
when everything - all of the language in that power of attorney is considered,
it's so - the intent that you just can't get around is that document was
entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as possible, it seems to
me, including the right to deal with interest in real property.
So I'm going to make a determination for purposes of this case that
that is a valid power of attorney for purposes of dealing with - including
giving Martha Perry's interest in that property.
So I'm going to decide that question for purposes of this case. (emphasis
added)
Tr., p. 11, LL. 8-25; p. 12, LL. 1-11; Magistrate Court Tr., p. 4. The District Court
concluded,
Paragraph A of the power of attorney allowed George to convey Martha's interests
in real property as he deemed proper. The power of attorney was executed in 2005
prior to the enactment of the current Uniform Power of Attorney Act, Idaho Code § 1512-101 et seq., in 2008. The present act requires express authority to make gifts, but it is
not applicable here. No authority has been cited requiring such language prior to the
adoption of the act. (emphasis added)
R., p. 709.
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For the first time in its briefing before this Court, the Department cites an A.L.R. treatise
for the general proposition that consideration must inure to the principal when general real
property powers are utilized by an agent to convey property. Appellant's Brief, p. 8. This
caused PR's counsel to review once again the deed's language. The July 31,2006 deed states in
pertinent part,
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, Martha Jean Perry, Grantor, does hereby convey,
release, remise and forever quitclaim until George D. Perry, whose address is 2104
Tendoy Drive, Boise, ID 83705, the following described premises, to-wit: .... This deed
in intended to convey to the Grantee all right, title, and interest of the Grantor in and to
said property, now owned or hereinafter acquired. (emphasis original).

R., p. 99.

This was not a gift deed. The word "gift" was not used at all. To the contrary, this

was a conveyance for consideration, as plainly stated on the face of the deed.
At the beginning of the hearing before the magistrate, Judge Bieter inquired as to whether
he could decide the matter on the evidence submitted. Both counsel stipulated that no
evidentiary hearing was necessary and the matter could be ruled upon based on the documents
submitted into evidence. The parties proceeded on that basis. The Department raised no
objection to admission of the July 31,2006 deed. Tr., p. 3, LL. 3 - p. 5, LL. 18. Magistrate
Court Tr., p. 2.
The Department has consistently challenged George's authority to sign the deed for
Martha, not the deed itself. The Department has never raised any issue with regard to the deed's
validity or delivery. The Department has always contended the conveyance was a gift and that
Martha's power of attorney was ineffective to allow George to sign the deed because the power
of attorney did not contain what the Department considered to be adequate gifting authority.
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In Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 174, 898 P.2d 1081 (1995), the Court found the deed
language "ONE DOLLAR and OTHER GOOD and VALUABLE CONSIDERATION" to be
unambiguous. The Court cited Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483,484, 777 P.2d 255 (1989) for the
holding that where a deed is plain and unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be
determined from the deed itself. The deed at issue in Hall actually contained the exact same
language as does the July 31,2006 deed at issue here. The Hall Court stated, "Where, as here,
the consideration clause clearly recites that the transfer was made "For Value Received," parol
evidence is not admissible to contradict the deed by attempting to show the transfer was in part a
fI

gift" rather than "for value.

II

(emphasis added). Id.

As noted above, the Department stipulated to the admission of the deed and did not raise
any challenge to the consideration clause in the deed or seek to introduce evidence for any
purpose on this issue. This case is unlike Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 21,232 P.3d 799 (2010),
or the cases cited therein, where the Court held that evidence beyond a deed was admissible to

show or disprove transmutation. The Department conceded the home was George's separate
property if the conveyance was effective. Tr., p. 11, LL. 22-25. The consideration clause, as in
Hall, is clear and unambiguous. The deed speaks for itself. The Department's claim that

Martha's power of attorney was inadequate because it lacked gifting powers fails entirely
because the deed itself establishes that the conveyance was "for value received" and thus not a
gift at aU 27 . The fact that the deed language -- never contested by either party -- establishes that

27 In briefing before the district court, the PR argued that the Department was precluded from raising a new issue on
appeal because the Department relied on a statute that it had not relied on below. R., p. 598. The Department
responded,
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the conveyance was "for value received" and was not a gift at all is relevant to the Court's
consideration of whether the provisions in the power of attorney are legally adequate to empower
George to convey Martha's remaining interest in the home to himself.
ii. Martha's Power Of Attorney Was More Than Sufficient To Allow George To Transfer
Martha's Interest In The Property To Himself.
This Court should find that Martha's power of attorney was more than adequate.
Martha's power of attorney is incredibly comprehensive. It starts out stating in all capital letters
that the "powers granted by this document are broad and sweeping." The power of attorney then
goes into great detail explaining a very wide variety of powers that are granted to George, as
agent. Paragraph (A) entitled "Real property transactions" is cited above. The authority granted
under this paragraph also includes the authority to "cancel" notes, mortgages, security interest, or
deeds to secure debt, which is equivalent to "giving away" assets of the principal, should that
even be an issue.
Martha's power of attorney also includes, under paragraph (H), entitled "Estate, trust, and
other beneficiary transactions" the power "To •.. exercise ... any .•. gift ••• for the

The personal representative is confusing "issue" with "authorities." The issue has always been the same:
Whether Martha's property conveyed by George to himself is subject to recovery. The Department is
merely citing additional authorities relating to this issue. If additional authorities could not be cited
much of the Respondent's Brief would have to be excluded. (emphasis added)
R., p. 686.
The Department's analysis is apt and applies to the July 31, 2006 deed. The issue remains the samewhether Martha's power of attorney gave George the requisite authority to convey Martha's interest in the home to
himself. The PR is simply presenting additional legal authority which supports the legal conclusion that the deed
was for consideration and not a gift. The deed itself was properly admitted before the magistrate and has been in
evidence throughout this case.
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principal.,,28 Martha expressly authorized George as her agent to make gifts on her behalf. By
including the qualifier that George, as agent, may exercise "any gift" on her behalf, Martha
broadened that power to authorize George to make gifts to any person, including himself. The
Magistrate held that although this language was not the "clearest kind of authority" he held that
the gifting language in paragraph H "certainly can be read that way." Tr., p. 11, LL. 12-13;
Magistrate Court Tr., p. 4. Martha's power of attorney satisfied I.C. § 32-912, if that statute is
even relevant (see discussion below)?9
The gifting authority that Martha gave to George must also be read in conjunction with
the other powers Martha granted to her husband, specifically the power to exercise all powers
with respect to Medicaid" that she could exercise. Paragraph (K) entitled, "Benefits from Social

Security, Medicare, Medicaid, or other governmental programs, or military service" authorizes
Martha's husband as her agent
"To ... file ... claims to any benefit or assistance under any federal, state, local
or foreign statute; and in general, exercise all powers with respect to •.•
government benefits, including but not limited to Medicare and Medicaid,
which the principal could exercise if present and under no disability.
(emphasis added).
Conveying the Medicaid spouse's interest in the couple's home to the community spouse
is expressly sanctioned by federal law and typical in cases of married couples where one spouse

28 The full sentence that contains this language states, "To accept, receipt for, exercise, release, reject, renounce,
assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or
payment due or payable to or for the principal." (emphasis added).
29The fact that a title company required the PR to sign off on the closing statement for Martha is not equivalent to a
legal finding that Martha's power of attorney was somehow deficient, as the Department implies. Appellant's Brief,
p. 11. That signature requirement is simply the title insurer covering its bases because the couple was married at the
time of the closing and Martha was still alive. It is standard procedure for a title insurer to have both spouses sign
off as a liability avoidance precaution.
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is qualifying for Medicaid benefits. Martha's power of attorney not only contemplated that her
agentlhusband could make such an interspousal transfer, it expressly authorized it. The
combination of the comprehensive power to "exercise any gift" and the comprehensive power to
"exercise all powers with respect to ... Medicaid" and "real property transactions" expressly
establishes that George acted well within his authority as Martha's agent in executing the deed
that the Department challenges.
The Department cites a number of cases to support its argument that Martha's power of
attorney was somehow insufficient. Appellant's Brief, p. 7-9. All of these cases are easily
distinguishable from the instant case. In none of those cases did the power of attorney contain
the specific gifting and Medicaid planning language that Martha's power of attorney contains. In
none of those cases did the power of attorney contain any gifting language whatsoever. In none
of those cases was an interspousal transfer at issue. In none of those cases was Medicaid at
issue.

In addition, every case the Department cites involved agents who were not spouses. In

the Department's cited cases, the non-spouse agents were conveying assets to themselves or to
other third parties, often in contravention of the principal's estate distribution plan or somehow
in contravention to what the principal would have intended.
In this case, Martha's agent was her husband, conveying Martha's remaining interest in a

home in which he was residing, to himself, while his wife was in a nursing home. Martha had
already taken action to put George's name on the title herself, indicating her intent he have
ownership in the home. George was the natural object of Martha's bounty.
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The interspousal transfer makes sense and was contemplated by the power of attorney
Martha put in place specifically to allow such actions. There simply are no concerns present in
this case regarding financial abuse of the principal, negation of the principal's estate plan or
fraud on the principal as was at issue in the authorities the Department relies upon.
"Powers of attorney are to be construed in accordance with the rules of interpretation of
written instruments generally.... ,,30

In construing a written instrument, a court must consider

it as a whole and give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible. 31 "The
intention of the donor or grantor is to be gathered from the instrument of creation.,,32 Reading
Martha's power of attorney in its entirety, one is struck by the comprehensiveness of the
document. In addition to the introductory language indicating that the powers conveyed to
George are broad and all-encompassing, the powers under each paragraph provide great detail
emphasizing and underscoring that conclusion33 .

iii. Martha's Power Of Attorney Met The Requirements Of I.e. § 15-5-501 et seq.

3 AmJur.2d Agency § 30, at 533-34 (1986).
Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Insurance Fund, /35 Idaho 434,437, 18 P.3d 956 (2000), citing Magic Valley
Radiology Associates, PA v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 565, 808 P.2d 1303, 1310(1991).
32 49 CJ. §§ 34,40. See also 72 C.J.S. Powers § 22 (1951)
33 Paragraph (B) entitled "Tangible personal property transactions" includes the power to,
in any way or manner deal with all or any part of any real or personal property whatsoever,
tangible or intangible, or any interest therein, that I own at the time of execution or may thereafter
acquire, under such terms and conditions, and under such covenants, as my Agent shall deem
proper." (emphasis added).
Paragraph (H), discussed above, also includes language granting the agent power to " ... in general, exercise all
powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could exercise if present and under no disability." The
other paragraphs in Martha's power of attorney consistently imbue George with authority to act with total and
absolute discretion. The Department's counsel actually agreed with this conclusion when he stated at the hearing
before the magistrate, " ... this is a very comprehensive power of attorney." Tr., p. 7, LL. 5-6; Magistrate Court Tr.,
p.3.
30

31
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I.C. § 15-5-501 et seq. was in effect at the time Martha signed the power of attorney and
governs that document. I.C. § 15-5-502 stated in pertinent part,
All acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during
any period of disability or incapacity of the principal have the same effect and ...
bind the principal and his successors in interest, as if the principal were competent
and not disabled.
Martha's power of attorney meets all of the requirements of I.C. § 15-5-501. I.e. § 15-5501 does not mandate that Martha was required to use any specific language or "terms of art" in
order to imbue her spouse/agent with the requisite authority to make the interspousal transfer at
issue34 . Yet as discussed above, the power of attorney does contain such language and is
completely sufficient under the law then in effect to allow George to sign the deed for Martha.
iv. The Department's I.e. § 32-912 Argument Is Without Merit.
I.C. § 32-906(2) entitled, "Community Property - Income From Separate and Community
Property - Conveyance Between Spouses", states in pertinent part,
Property conveyed by one spouse to the other shall be presumed to be the sole and
separate estate of the grantee and only the grantor spouse need execute and
acknowledge the deed or other instrument of conveyance notwithstanding the
provisions of section 32-912, Idaho Code; ...
I.C. § 32-912 "evinces a legislative policy of protecting community real property from creditors,
unless both spouses agree in writing to incur the debt.,,35 I.C. § 32-912 is not designed to address

34

35

The district court agreed stating,
Paragraph A of the power of attorney allowed George to convey Martha's interests in real property as he
deemed proper. The power of attorney was executed in 2005 prior to the enactment of the current Uniform
Power of Attorney Act, Idaho Code § 15-12-101 et seq., in 2008. The present act requires express
authority to make gifts, but it is not applicable here. No authority has been cited requiring such
language prior to the adoption of the act. (emphasis added). R., p. 709.
Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 713, 779 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1989)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 42

interspousal transfers. Pursuant to I.e. § 32-906(2), George signing the deed as agent for Martha
was all that was required, notwithstanding I.e. § 32-91236.
v. The Magistrate Made Findings of Fact On The Power Of Attorney Issue Which
Support The Legal Conclusion That The Power of Attorney Was Sufficient As A Matter Of
Law.
The Department argues that "the Magistrate's discussion of this issue ... is confined to a
footnote.,,37 Appellant's Brief, p. 5. The Magistrate's legal conclusion as stated in the Order
Disallowing Claim was supported by explicit findings of fact made at the hearing. There is no
prohibition against a magistrate making oral findings of fact 38 . The Magistrate's findings are
cited above and found at Tr., p. 11, LL. 8-25; p. 12, LL. 1-11; Magistrate Court Tr., p. 4.
The Magistrate clearly ruled not only that paragraph H in the power of attorney was
sufficient, but also that the comprehensive nature of the document supported a conclusion that
Martha's power of attorney gave George sufficient authority to legally effectuate the interspousal
transfer. The Magistrate found as a matter of fact that Martha intended to give George the
necessary authority in the power of attorney to transfer the property to himself and found that the
power of attorney was sufficient, as a matter of law, to allow George the authority to make the
interspousal transfer at issue. The district court affirmed this ruling and so should this Court.
36 Throughout this proceeding the PR has asserted that an alternative ground to sustain Martha's power of attorney
applied in this case -- common law interspousal agency. The PR reiterates that argument based on Lowry v. Ireland
Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 713, 779 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1989), wherein this Court stated that "an agency may be ...
inferred from the circumstances and conduct of the parties." citing Noble. 91 Idaho at 368, 421 P.2d at 448 (1966)
(existence of the wife's agency was a question of fact to be determined by the finder of the facts from the husband's
and wife's dealings, circumstances, and conduct). Martha's actions in putting the power of attorney in place, the
comprehensive language it contains, and the Magistrate's factual findings (discussed below), supports this Court
affirming the interspousal conveyance based on the alternative ground of common law interspousal agency.
37 This same argument was made below and rebutted below. The Department once again ignores what occurred at
the hearing. The District Court also discussed this same point in her Order. R., p. 708.
38 See e.g., State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 776, 992 P.2d 769 (1999)
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K. THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON
APPEAL

Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b)(5) and I.e. § 12-117, the PR claims attorney fees on appeal. The
Department's appeal lacks any reasonable basis in fact or in law. Neither federal law, nor I.C. §
56-218(4)(b), which mirrors federal law, permits the Department's claim against property in
which the Medicaid recipient has no title or interest at the time of her death. The plain,
unambiguous language of these statutes supports this conclusion. If this was not enough, the
Court's decision In re: Barg, decided July of 2008, and the U.S. Solicitor General's opinion
issued May of 2009, clearly put the Department on notice that the type of claim made in this case
was impermissibly broad and violated federal law. The Department has chosen to pursue this
appeal by asserting an erroneous interpretation of clear, unambiguous federal and state statutory
language, thereby justifying an award to the Estate of attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Personal Representative respectfully requests that the
Court affirm the Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim in its entirety and award the Estate
attorney fees on appeal.
DATED this 19th day of September, 2011.

Attorney for Personal Representative
Estate of George D. Perry
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE mRlD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

MAQTSTRATE DIVISION
IN THE MATIER OF THE ESTATE OF

Vivian M. Wiggins and
Emerson Wiggins
Deceased.

)
)

Case No. CV 2009-1926

)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
DENYING PETITIONER'S CLAIM
AGAINST TI-IE ESTATE

Hearing on the Department of Health & Welfare's petition for allowance of a
claim against the estate of Vivian M. Wiggins and Emerson D. Wiggins was heard on the
....
rd
3 day of February 2010. Corey Cartwright appeared on behalf of the claimant, the
Department of Health & Welfare. The personal representative Lynn Wiggins appeared
and was represented by R. Brad Masingill.
Bach:ground

A joint estate was opened May 21, 2009, pursuant to Idaho Code 15-3-111. On
November 23,2009 the Department of Health & Welfare filed a claim (pursuant to Idaho
Code 15-3-804) against the estate for medical assistance paid on behalf of the decedent
Vivian M. Wiggins in the amount of $264,674.45 made pursuant to Idaho Code 56.. 218.
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The personal representative filed a Notice of Disallowance of the claim pursuant
to Idaho Code 15-3-806 on November 30~ 2009. The claimant filed a Petition for
Allowance of Claim pursuant to Idaho Code 15 3.. 806 on December 1, 2009.
w

The parties stipulated to the following facts:
1.

TIle Department of Health & Welfare treated Vivian Wiggins and
Emerson Wiggins as though they had a Man-iage Settlement Agreement
(hereinafter MSA) which divided their assets.

2.

The MSA transmutted Vivian W~gins and Emerson Wiggin's community
property to separate property.

3.

Although no executed copy or original MSA was presented to the court~
the parties agreed that one was executed in 2002.

4.

The first application for Medicaid Assistance took place in 2002 and the
second occurred August 27,2003.

5.

Unless the MSA had been execl.lted, Vivian Wiggins would not have been
eligible for Medicaid Benefits.

6.

Plaintiff's Exhibits A through G were admitted; they support the amount
claimed by the Department $264,674.45 that was paid on behalf of Vivian
Wiggins and has not been recovered; and, that a Notice of a Statutory
Claim regarding the Estate of Vivian Wiggins was scnt to the Personal

Representative on March 5,2009 (Plaintiff's Exhibit B).
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The court further finds based on the pleadings that Vivian and Emerson Wiggins
were married at the time of Vivian's death. Vivian M Wiggins died on the 30 th day of
January 2009. Emerson Dale Wiggins died on F"ebruary 9) 2009.
The personal representative did not contest the amount of the claim or that the
Medicaid funds were expended for the care of Vivian Wiggins.
The assets in the joint estate were the separate property of Emerson Wiggins.

The Department did not challenge the vaHdity of the MSA, even though no
original or copy of the original was delivered to the CO\lrt and no proof was made that the
MSA conlplied with Idaho Code sections 32-916 et. Seq. The Department has not
brought any action in the district court to challenge the MSA.

Issue

May the Department recover Medicaid benefits paid for Vivian's care from the
separate property of her husband, Emerson?
Idaho Code 56-218 provides for the recovery of Medicaid benefits from the

estates of deceased Medicaid recipients and their spouses. Idaho Code 56.. 2 J8 provides;
(1) Recovery of Certain Medicaid Assistance - (1) Except where exempted or

waived in accordance with federal law, medical assistance pursuant to this chapter
paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when
the individual received such assistance, may be recovered from the individuals
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both:
The Department argues that the legal basis for its claim against Emerson's
separate property is Idaho Department of Ilealth and Welfare v. Jackman 132 Idaho 213
(1998). That case parallels this case factually, Jackman's holding is that the Department
is not limited to the estate of the recipient for recovery of Medicaid benefits, but may
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recover amounts from the estate of the recipient's spouse. The Idaho Supreme Court held
that: (1) "if the estate of the individual who received Medicaid assistance is inadequate
to repay the full amount of the assistance received, the Department can recover the
balance from the estate of the surviving spouse, but (2) federal law, as in effect when

recipient and her husband entered into marital settlement agreement transmitting most of
recipient's and husband's community property into separate property of husband, limited
the Department to recovering any community property
recipient and husband may have
...
accumulated after the agreement.
In this matter the personal representative for the estate denied the claim because
the claim to recover for benefits paid on behalf of Vivian Wjggins was made against
property which pursuant to the MSA would be the separate property of Emerson
Wiggins.
The Department argues that recovery against the separate property of Emerson
should be allowed because the MSA between Emerson and Vivian occurred in 2002 after
the law applicable in Jackman was amended to include a more expansive definition of
"estate" and "asset", In Jackman the parties entered into a MSA in April of 1993 and the
Federal Law was amended in October of 1993 (OBRA 93).
The Departmenfs claim relics on an interpretation of the definition of "estate"
and "assets" found in Idaho and federal statutes amended in October of 1993. 42 U.S.C.
1396p(b)(4) provides:
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased
individualMEMORANDUM DECISION
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(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within
the individual; s estate, as defined for plllposes of State pro hate Jaw; and

-

(8) may include, at the option of the State ... any other real and personal property
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the
time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed
to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, surVivorship, life estate, living, or other arrangement.
The term "asset" is defined in 42 U.s.C. 1396(11):
(1) The term "asset", with respect to an individual, includes all income and
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any
income or l'esources which the individual or such individual's spouse is
entitled to but does not receive because of action(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, ...

The Department argues that it doesn't matter whether the property is Emerson's
separate property or not because the Department may under these definitions recover

...

against any property which had been the couple's community property at any time after
October 1, 1993;
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. - Lin1its on the Department's claim against the assets
of a deceased participant or spouse are subject to Sections 56-218 and 56-21 SA, Idaho
Code. A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the
assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October!, 1993, community property,
or the deceased participant's share ofthe separate property, and jointly owned property.
.. .IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20.
The Department points to the language in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B) as the basis
for its position that property transferred to the spouse after the look back period is
recoverable. TIlis proposition is based on the Department's interpretation that ~'other
arrangement" contained in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)('!)(B) includes property transfelTed by
way of a Marriage Settlement Agreement. That section contains a laundry list of assets
which may be recovered at the option of the State, "assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or
MEMORANDUM DECISION
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assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estatc, living trust) or other arrangement."
All of the specific transfers of property listed in that section occur in an automatic
fashion upon the death ofthe owner. Under the Departmcnfs interpretation all
arrangements or transfers of any type occurring after the look-back date would be "other
arrangementsH • There is no specific mention oflVIarciagc Settlement Agreements in that
section.
Marriage Settlement Agreements are recognizcd under Idaho law and require
specific statutory cOl'npliance 32-916 et. Seq. An MSA allows one spouse to transmute
community property to the other. Furthermore, the Idaho legislature contemplated that
transfers could be made by recipients of Medicaid andlor their spouses without
compensation in order to avoid repayment. A remedy is provided in Idaho Code 56-218
(2) which addresses these transfers. That section provides that transfers of real or
personal property, on or after the look.. back datcs defined in 42 U.S.C. ] 396p, by
recipients of such aid, or their spouses, without adequate consideration are voidable and
may be set aside by an action in the district court.
A transfer of community property by a Marriage Settlement Agreement is not an
automatic transfer like those specifically listed in 42 U.S.C. 1396(b)(4)(B). Another
remedy for recovery is provided in Idaho Code 56-218(2). The Departments expansive
interpretation to include all transactions is not reasonable.
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Conclusion

The Marriage Settlement Agreement in this case has not been voided. The assets
in the estate are the separate property of Emerson; there is no evidence to the contrary.
The Department may only recover against property in which the recipient spouse had an

interest at the time of her death. Since Vivian predeceased Emerson she has no legal
interest in the Separate Property of Emerson under Idaho Law. The Department's Claim
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IN TIlE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE nnRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIlE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

IN TIlE MATIER OF THE ESTATE OF
VIVIAN WIGGINS and

EMERSON D. WIGGINS,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-1926

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON APPEAL

-------------------------)
Tbis matter came on for hearing on February 8, 2011, on appeal from the trial court's
Memorandum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate. Appellant was
represented by Corey Cartwright, Deputy Attorney General, I-Iuman Services Division and the

Respondent, who is the personal representative for the Estate of Vivian Wiggins and Emerson D.
W1ggins, was represented by Brad Masingill. Respondent filed a Notice of Augmentation and/or
Supplementation of his Brief on March 21.2011, which included the recent appeUate decision in
the Ada County case of George D. Perry, CV-IE·2009-5214. The Court having heard and
considered the arguments of counsel as well as the briefing filed, now issues this Memorandum

Decision on Appeal.
I. FACTS

and died on January 30,2009. Emerson

Vivian Wiggins was horn
Wiggins was born

and died on February 9, 2009. Vivian and Emerson were

1
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married and continued to be married at the time they applied for Medicaid benefits and up until
the time of Vivian's death.

In June 2002, Vivian was admitted to a nursing home. Emerson

and Vivian applied for medical assistance on November 18,2002 to help pay for Vivian's
medical care and again on August 27, 2003. Vivian became eligible for Medicaid on September
1,2003, and between that time and Vivian's death, the Department of Health and Welfare
(Department) paid for Vivian'g medical care through Medicaid, in the sum of at least
$272,134.68. The Department received a voluntary payment in April 2008, in the amount of
$7,460.23, resulting in the Department's claim anl0unt of $264.876.45.
A joint probate estate for Vivian and Emerson (the Estate) was opened on May 21, 2009.
and the inventory which was filed shows assets of $78,659.44. On November 23, 2009, the
Department filed a claim against the Estate for medical assistance paid on behalf of Vivian in the
amount of$264,674.45. The Estate's personal representative filed a Notice ofDisallowanee of
Claim on November 30~ 2009. The trial court heard the Department's petition for allowance ofa
claim against the Estate on February 3. 2010. The partie::; stipulated in open court that the
Department treated Vivian as if she had entered into a Marriage Settlement Agreement (MBA) in
2002 or 2003, but that a copy of the MSA cannot be found. The admitted purpose of the MSA
was to transfer any assets in which Vivian had an interest to Emerson~ as his sole and separate
property, so that she would be considered eligible to receive Medicaid benefits. The trial court
found that the assets in the Estate were Emerson' s separate property based upon the MSA which
had transmuted the community property to separate property, and there was no legal obligation

owed by Emerson's Estate to repay the Department for his wife's care from his separate
property. The trial court disallowed the Department's claim in its Memorandum Decision filed
on March 30, 2010. The Department appealed that decision to this Court.

2
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ll. ISSUES ON APPEAL:
While the Department I1sts a number of issues in its opening brief; the basic assertion js
that the Magistrate Judge erred .in detennining that a valid MBA existed and that the MSA
transmuted Vivian and Emerson's community property to the separate property of Emerson from
which the Department could not recover. TIle Department also argues that in maktngthat
detennination. the trial court improperly interpreted and applied Idaho Code Section 56-218 and
42 U.s.C. 13961', Both parties assert they are entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

UI.

LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Department has appealed the trial court's decision to deny the Department's Petition

for Allowance of Claim seeking recovery from the Estate of money spent on Vivian's healthcare.
The Department argues that it is entitled to recover this money under 1. C. §S6-218 from assets
which were the separate property of Emerson at the time of Vivian's death. The Department also
contends that Vivian's estate includes the property she transferred to Emerson through the MSA

and is an asset which is subject to a claim for Medicaid reimbursement under both federal and
state law. Finally, the Department asserts that it did not stipulate to all of the faets the magistrate
judge relied on in his decision.
Respondent argues that under both state and federal law, the claim filed by the
Department only applied to property in which Vivian had an interest as of the date of her death
and does not apply against Emerson's separate property which he acquired when the MSA
transmuted the community property to separate property.

3
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Standard of review
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge as an appellate

proceeding, rather than exercising the option of granting a trial de novo. the district judge is
acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596 (1992).
A court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial and
competent, though conflicting, evidence. LR.C.P. 52(a). The trial court is the arbiter of
conflicting evidence; its determination of the weight, credibility, inference, and implications
thereof win not be supplanted by this Court's impressions or conclusions from tlle written record

Johannsen v. Utterbeck. 146 Idaho 423, 431-432, 196 P.3d 341,349.350 (2008).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review. State v. Hart. 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). Interpretation of a statute
begins with an examination of the statute's literal words. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659,
978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts
give effect to the statute as

written~

without engaging in statutory construction. Stale v. Rhode,

133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). Only where the Janguage is ambiguous wW this
Conrt look to rules of construction for guidance and consider the reasonableness of proposed
interpretations. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State Deptt ofAgric.. 143 Idaho 36o,
368, 146 P.3d 632,634 (2006). Moreover. unless a contrary purpose is clearly indicated,
ordinary words will be given their ordinary meaning when construing a statute. Bunt v. City of
Garden City, 118 Idaho 427, 430~ 797 P.2d 135, 138 (1990). In construing a statute, this Court

will not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation. but will ascertain and give effect to the
purpose and intent ofthe legislature, based on the whole act and every word therein, lending

4
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substance and meaning to the provisions. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue. 148 Idaho

391.,398,224 PJd 458~ 465 (2008).

B.

Stipulation of facts
At the hearing before the trial court, both the Department and the Estate, through their

respective attorneys, stipulated to the fact that the Department treated Vivian and Emerson as if

an MSA had been entered into between them prior to Vivian's receipt of Medicaid assistance.
They further stipulated that the MSA was entered into for the purpose of transmuting Vivian's
interest in the community property to Emerson' s separate property so she could meet the
eligibiHty requirements to receive Medicaid!. Both agreed that the original MSA could not be
located. On appeal the Department is challenging the existence of the MSA and its effect in
transmuting property, even though it failed to raise the issue with the trial court and appears,
from the record. to have af:,'Teed to these facts. Based up<.m the parties> stipulation, the Court will
not address this issue further.

C.

Idaho Code Section 56-218(1)
The Department argues that I.C. §56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate oIthe

recipient of Medicaid and also from the estate of the recipient's spouse. Respondent argues that
the claim filed by the Department only applied to property in which Vivian. had an interest as of

the date of her death and

doe~

not apply against Emerson's separate property.

Idaho Code Section 56-218 is entitled "Recovery of certain medical assistance" and
provides in part:
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal
law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on hehalf of an
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the
! ft appears the intent was to enable Vivian to become eligible for Medicaid assistance while at the same time
leaving Emerson, who did not need nursing home care. with enough money on which to live while Vivian was in the
nursing home.
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individual received such assistance may be recovered from the
individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid
paid to either or both ....
The Department argues that this section give~ broad authority for the Department to seek
recovery from the spouse of a Medicaid recipient fOT any monies owed. Admittedly this part of
the statute appears to allow such recovery, but there are additional provisions which narrow this
authority.
Idaho Code §56-218(4) states as follows:
For purposes of this section. the term "estate" shall include:
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law;
and
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which
the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to
the extent of such interest, including such assets conveyed to a
survivor. heir, or assign, ofthe deceased individual through joint
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust
or other arrangement.
The Department agrees that "individual" as used in this statute refers to the recipient, Le. Vivian.
Thus~

the question becomes, once the MSA was executed, was there any property in which

Vivian had "any legal title or interest at the time of death?" It appears from a plain reading of
this section that the recipient's estate includes not only property in which the recipient had a
legal interest but also property which passed by operation of law to someone else at the time of
the recipient's death. Neither of those circumstances would include property which the recipient
had sold~ given away or transferred prior to death.
Part of the difficulty is that the Department's interpretation of what should be included in
the recipient's estate ignores Idaho community property law and does not address the impact of
having separate property in the recipient's spouse's estate. Indeed. in its brief, the Department
asserts that I.e. §56-218(1) "effectively alters marital property law in Idaho when it comes to the
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property of Medicaid recipients and their spouses." There is no indication in this statute that the
Idaho legislature intended such a sweeping change by simply authorizing the State to assert a
claim against a recipienCs spouse's estate.
Idaho Code defines sepatate property in Section 32-903 as;

All property of either the husband or the wife owned by him or her
before marriage, and that acquired afterward by either by gift,
bequest, devise or descent, or that which either he or she shall
acquire with the proceeds of his or her separate propertyt by way
of moneys or other property, shaH remain his or her sole and
separate property.
A debt incurred by the Medicaid recipient is a community debt and clearly the recip.ient'~ interest

i.ll separate property or in the tecipient's share of community property would be liable. Idaho
Code §32-91 t states: "The separate property of the wife [husband] is not liable for the debts of
her husband [his wife), but is liable for her own debts contracted before or after mamage."
TypicaUy, under Idaho community property law. the spouse's separate property is not Hable for
debts incurred by the other spouse, I.C. § 32-912, entitled "Control of community property"
provides:

Either the hushand or the wife shall have the right to manage and control
the community property, and eitber may hind the community property by
contract, except that neither the husband nor wife may sell, conveyor
encumber the community real estate unless the other joins in executing the
sale agreement. deed or other instrument of conveyance by which the real
estate is sold. conveyed or encumbered, and any community obligation
incurred by either the husband or the wife without the consent in writing
ofthe other shall not obligate the separate properly ofthe spouse who did
no! so consent; provided, however, that the husband or wife may by
express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell,
conveyor encumber community property, either real or personal. All
deeds~ conveyances, bills of sale~ or evidences of debt heretofore made in
conformity herewith are hereby validated. (emphasis added)
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There is nothing in the record to indicate that Emerson signed in ""Tiring agreeing to bind his
separate property for the debts of Vivian. While that may very wen have been part of the
Medicaid application process, it is not in the record. Thus, while I.e.

§56~2l8

gives the

Department the legal authority to seek reimbursement from both spouses, it doesn't answer the
question of which assets in the estate are liable for the Medicaid debt.
At the hearing in this matter, the Department admitted that it cannot pursue property that
has always been the separate property of the recipient's spouse (even though this contradicts the'
Department's argument that I.e. 56-218 broadly allows recovery against both, spouses' estates).

The Department contends it can coHeet from separate property that was once community
property if it Wag community property after October 1, 1993, and it justifies this position by
citing to a Department rule that provides as tollows:

IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (deleted in 2010)
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. Limits on the Department's claim
against the assets of a deceased participant or spouse are subject to
Sections 56-218 and 56-21SA, Idaho Code. A claim against the
estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the
assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 1993.
community property. or the deceased patticipant's share of the
separate property, and jointly owned property. Recovery will not
be made until the deceased participant no longer is survived by a
spouse, a child who is under age twenty-one (2 I), or a blind or
disabled child, as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c as amended and,
when applicable, ag provided in Subsection 900.09 oftrus rule. No
recovery will be made if the participant received medical
assistance as the result of a crime committed against the
participant. (3~30-07)
IDMA 16.03.09.900.24 (deleted in 2010)
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which
separates assets for a mamed couple does not eliminate the debt
against the estate of the deceased participant or the spouse.
Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or other such
agreement may be voided ifnot for adequate consideration. (3-30.
07)
8
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Both of the IDAPA rules that the Department relics on were deleted in 2010. At oral argument
the Department was unable to justify the reasoning or logic to support its .position that some
separate property of the recipient's spouse is liable to the State whiJe other separate property is
not (apart from the Rule mentioned above),
Thus, while I.e. §56-218 gives the Department the authority to seek recovery from the
estate of a Medicaid recipient's spouse, it does not answer the question of whether it controls
over Idaho's community property law and allows recovery from separate property which would
otherwise not be liable for community debts incurred by the recipient Absent some clear
authority, this Court does not read this statute to do so.

D.

Meaning of "estate"
The Department argues that not only can it coHect from separate property in Emerson's

estate, but it ean also collect from property which once belonged to Vivian.

It makes this

argument based on the definition of "estate" contained in federal and state Jaws. The Department
argues that I.e. §56-218 authorizes recovery in this case because the statute does not say that
recovery is limited to assets of the community. Respondent argues that the federal statute only
provides recovery for property in Vivian's estate; property jn which Vivian had an interest at the

time of her death; and community property.
The Idaho Supreme Court has reviewed the federal Medicaid program and its relationship

with the state. "While it is often thought of as providing medical care only for the .indigen~ it
also provides coverage for the aged whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the

costs of necessary medical services including nursing horne care." Stafford v. Idaho Dept. of

Health & Welfare, 145 Idaho 530, 534, 181 .P.3d 456, 460 (2008), The States operate Medicaid

by their own design but these programs must be consistent with federal standar.ds and
regUlations. Id. Both the federal government and the state government expect federal law to
9
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predominate III determining qualifications for receipt of Medicaid assistance. Id. FinaIly~ the
Court went on to comment that: "Over the years, as the Medicaid program evolved from strictly

an indigent assistance program to one that provided assistance to elderly persons who stnlggle to
meet the cost of medical and nursing home care, steps were taken to keep those recipients from
having to divest themselves of their home and other basic resources." Id.

The de.fiuitions of "estate" under state law and fcdera11aw are similar. The state
definition which is found at I.e. §56-218(4) was previously quoted above. The federal1aw
governing Medicaid defines "estate" in Title 42 U.S.CA. § 1396p as follows:
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid tu'lder a State plan
(4) For purpo!\es of this subsecdon~ the term "estate", with respect to a deceased
individual(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and
(B) may include1 at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of an individual
to whom paragraph (1)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal property and other
assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to th.e
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of
the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common. survivorship, life
estate, Hving trust. or other arrangement.

Thus fcclcrallaw includes all assets in the recipient's estate which would be allowed under state
probate law, and also allows the state to broaden "estate'~ for purposes of recovering medical
assistance to include other property in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, as
Idaho has. Federal law does not discuss the impact of state community property laws and~
presumably, that must be up to the state.
The Department admitted that the state and federal definitions of "estate" apply only to
the '"individual's" estate (Le. recipient, not spouse of recipient). The Department also agrees that
Vivian had no legal interest in any property at the time ofhar death; however, it argues that the
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federal definition ofuassets" found in 42 USC 1396p(11)(l) must be incorporated. The federal
law governing Medicaid defines '''assets'' in Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p as foHows:
(h) Definitions
In this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) The term <tassets". with respect to an individual, includes all
income and resources of the 1ndivldual and of the individual's
spouse, including any income or resources which the individual or
such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive because
ofa060n-(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse,
(B) by a persont including a court or administrative body, with
legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or
such individual's spouse, or
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body,
acting at the direction or upon the request ofthe individual or such
individual's spouse.
That provision, which is difficult to understand at best, broadens what should be included in the
recipient's estate and appears to include resources which the recipient would have had in his or
her estate but for the actions ofthe recipient or the recipient's spouse. While tb.is would appear
to include property transmuted by virtue of an MSA as the Department argues. there is nothing in
the statute that makes this happen automatically. Tn other words~ simply because the definition
of "assets" could include that property doesn't mean that such transactions are set aside without
further action. There should be some action taken to recover those resources into the recipient's
estate, such as setting aside the MSA, which will be discussed later in this Decjsion.

E.

Effect of Idalt() Dept ofHealtlz and Welfare v. Jackman
In its brief, the Department argues that the issue presented by this appeal has already been

decided by the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho Dept. qfHealth and Welfare v. Jac/cman, 132
Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998). That case does have facts similar to those in this case but it
addressed the version afLe. §56-218 in effect in 1993. In Jackman. a marriage settlement
agreement was signed, which transmuted most ofthe wife's community property into the

11
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separate property of the husband. After the wife died> her estate was probated and the money left
in her estate was paid to the State as partial reimbursement for the Medicaid paid on behalf of the
\vife. After the husband died, the State sought to obtain additional monies owed for the wife's

Cafe from the husband's estate. The Court held that the federal statute regarding recovery of
IYiedicaid assistance as it existed in 1993> did not permit the Department to recover from the

husband's estate. This was so because the definition of "assets" from which recovery could be
made excluded "assets disposed of on or before [Aug. 10, 1993]." Because the MSA executed
by Jackman was signed prior to this date~ any assets transferred by that document were excluded.
While the Supreme Court did tal.k about the effect of the 1993 amendments in broadening the
definition ofuassets," that was not necessary to the Court's decision based on its reasoning. The
Court was not presented direcdy with the question of whether? un.der tbe law as it now exists,
federal law would trump state community property laws in making separate property liable for
debts that could otherwise not be recovered from separate property.
While it would seem that the Department has no recourse against assets transferred to the
recipient's spouse, there is an additional provision which allows it to set aside the MSA and
place tbe assets back in the recipient's estate. Thus, regardless of how the tenns <'estate" and
"assets" are interpreted, there is a process through which the Department can set aside the MSA
and can collect current or former community property from both spouses' estates as ifthe MSA
never existed.

F.

Application of I.e. §56-218 (2)
Idaho Code Section 56-218(2) states:

Transfers of real or personal property, on or after the look-back
dates defined in 42 U.S.C. 1396p~ by recipient.:; of such aid, or their
spouses, without adequate consideration are voidable and may be
set aside by an action in the distri.ct court.
12
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This statute has also been incorporated into a Department rule:
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (deleted in 2010)
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which
separates assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt
against the estate of the deceased participant or the spouse.
Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or other such
agreement may be voided if not for adequate consideration. (3-3007)
If the terms "estate" and

"asset'~

are as broad as has been argued by the Department, those terms

would automatically include any property transferred by an MSA and there would be no need to
set aside such an agreement. Not every transfer of property by a Medicaid recipient is improper

or without adequate consideration, nor should transferred property automatically be included in
the individual's estate and be liable for reimbursement of Medicaid benefits paid. Some action
should be required in order for those resources to be included and I.e. §56-218(2) is the vehicle
for doing so.

TIle Department argues this proYision is of no use to them in cases like tbe cucrellt one
because there is a three-year statute of limitations for setting aside the MSA and that ran in 2005,
well before Emerson died. This is a matter which could be addressed by the Idaho legislature in
order to give the Department more time within which to set aside the MSA. It is not a
justification for broadly interpreting the meaning of "estate" or amending Idaho community
property law so the Department doesn't have to go through the process of setting aside an MSA.

The Department further argues that it can't go back and void the MSA after the fact
because that would render Vivian "ineligible" for benefits, meaning that she should never have

received benefits in the first place. That argument ignores the fact that I.C. §56-218 (2)
specifically provides that any transfer of property without adequate consideration is Hvo1dabl~"
not "yoid". A voidable contract is one in which the parties have the power to avoid the contract
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provisiol1S) or they can ratifY it and it will continue in effect Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 180,45 P.3d 829, 836 (2002); Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §7.

A void contract is one that is treated as jf it never existed, void ab initio. TIle consequences of
voiding a voidable contract vary depending on the circumstances; thus, setting aside tbe MSA
would no! necessarily retroactively affect benefits already paid to the recipient.
Moreover, 42 USC I 396p(e)(2)(B)(i), which governs asset transfers for the purposes of
Medicaid reimbursement provides in part as follows:

(2) An individual shaH not be ineligible for medical assistance by
reason of paragraph (1) to the extent that--

***

(B) the assets··
(0 were transferred to the individual's spouse or to another for the
sole benefit of the individual's spouse,

This means a recipient is not ineligible for benefits by reason of having disposed of assets for
less than their fair market value to the extent that the assets were transfetred to a spouse for the
spouse's benefit. That is exactly what LC. §56~218 (2) is designed for - it allows the State to set
aside transfers that Jack consideration) and the transfer doesn't render the recipient ineligible for
benefits.

G.

Attorney fees
Both parties have asserted a fight to attomey fees pUfsuant to Idaho Code §12-117 which

provides as follows:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any
administrative proceedings Of civil judicial proceeding
involving as adverse parties a state agency or pontical
subdivision and a person~ the state agency or political
subdivision or the court, as the case may be, shall award the
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees. witness fees
and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact
or law.
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are difficult and complex,;

involving i11terpretation of state and federal Medicaid benefits Jaw. While this Court has

concluded that the maglstra.tejudge was correct in denying the Department's claim. the answer is
by no means simple or dear and both parties presented persuasive arguments regarding their

views of how the statutes and administrative rules should be interpreted. This is clearly not a

situation where either party acted "·without a reasonable basis in fact or law" and therefore, both
requests for attorneys fees on appeal are denied. The Respondent is entitled to its costs on
appeal.

IV. CONCLUSION
The burden is on the Department to assert a cognizable claim against Vivian and

Emerson's Esta.te and to support it by citation to some statute. The statutes must be clear that not
only can the Department coUect from. the recipient, Vivian, but ~hat there's a statutory basis for

claiming property of Emerson which would otherwise not be Hable for Vivian's debts under

Idaho's community property law. While Vivian's estate could have included property she
transmuted to Emerson utilizing I.e. §56·218 (2), that was not done in this casco Broadening the
meaning of "estate" under Idaho law in order to reach Emerson's separate property, or altering
accepted community property law, is not an alternative solution to allow recovery to the
Department. Based on the reasoning above~ the decision of the trial

DATED this

~
b:::d.
day of July, 2011.
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